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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS — A CATEGORY ARISING IN
LINEAR LOGIC, COMPLEXITY THEORY, AND SET THEORY
Andreas Blass
Abstract. A category used by de Paiva to model linear logic also occurs in Vojta´sˇ’s
analysis of cardinal characteristics of the continuum. Its morphisms have been used
in describing reductions between search problems in complexity theory. We describe
this category and how it arises in these various contexts. We also show how these
contexts suggest certain new multiplicative connectives for linear logic. Perhaps the
most interesting of these is a sequential composition suggested by the set-theoretic
application.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss a category that has appeared explicitly
in work of de Paiva [15] on linear logic and in work of Vojta´sˇ [21, 22] on cardinal
characteristics of the continuum. We call this category PV in honor of de Paiva
and Vojta´sˇ (or, more informally, in honor of Peter and Valeria). The same category
is implicit in a concept of many-one reduction of search problems in complexity
theory [12, 19].
The objects of PV are binary relations between sets; more precisely they are
triples A = (A−, A+, A), where A− and A+ are sets and A ⊆ A− ×A+ is a binary
relation between them. (We systematically use the notation of boldface capital
letters for objects, the corresponding lightface letters for the relation components,
and subscripts − and + for the two set components.) A morphism from A to
B = (B−, B+, B) is a pair of functions f− : B− → A− and f+ : A+ → B+ such
that, for all b ∈ B− and all a ∈ A+,
A(f−(b), a) =⇒ B(b, f+(a)).
(Note that the function with the minus subscript goes backward.) Composition of
these morphisms is defined componentwise, with the order reversed on the minus
components: (f ◦ g)− = g− ◦ f− and (f ◦ g)+ = f+ ◦ g+. This clearly defines a
category PV.
The category PV is the special case of de Paiva’s construction GC from [15]
where C is the category of sets. It is also the dual of Vojta´sˇ’s category GT of
generalized Galois-Tukey connections [21, 22].
Intuitively, we think of an object A of PV as representing a problem (or a type of
problem). The elements of A− are instances of the problem, i.e., specific questions
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of this type; the elements of A+ are possible answers; and the relation A represents
correctness, i.e., A(x, y) means that y is a correct answer to the question x.
There are strong but superficial similarities between PV and a special case of a
construction due to Chu and presented in the appendix of [1] and Section 3 of [2].
(Readers unfamiliar with the Chu construction can skip this paragraph, as it will
not be mentioned later.) Specifically, Chu’s construction, applied to the cartesian
closed category of sets and the object 2, yields a ∗-autonomous category in which
the objects are the same as those of PV and the morphisms differ from those of
PV only in that they are required to satisfy A(f−(b), a) ⇐⇒ B(b, f+(a)) rather
than just an implication from left to right. This apparently minor difference in the
definition leads to major differences in other aspects of the category. Specifically,
the internal hom-functor and the tensor product in Chu’s category are entirely
different from those of PV .
In the next few sections, we shall describe how PV arose in various contexts.
Thereafter, we indicate how ideas that arise naturally in these contexts suggest
new constructions in linear logic.
Reductions of Search Problems
Much of the theory of computational complexity (e.g., [8]) deals with decision
problems. Such a problem is specified by giving a set of instances together with a
subset called the set of positive instances; the problem is to determine, given an
arbitrary instance, whether it is positive. In a typical example, the instances might
be graphs and the positive instances might be the 3-colorable graphs. In another
example, instances might be boolean formulas and positive instances might be the
satisfiable ones. A (many-one) reduction from one decision problem to another is
a map sending instances of the former to instances of the latter in such a way that
an instance of the former is positive if and only if its image is positive. Clearly, an
algorithm computing such a reduction and an algorithm solving the latter decision
problem can be combined to yield an algorithm solving the former.
There are situations in complexity theory where it is useful to consider not
only decision problems but also search problems. A search problem is specified by
giving a set of instances, a set of witnesses, and a binary relation between them; the
problem is to find, given an instance, some witness related to it. For example, the 3-
colorability decision problem mentioned above (given a graph, is it 3-colorable?) can
be converted into the 3-coloring search problem (given a graph, find a 3-coloring).
Here the instances are graphs, the witnesses are 3-valued functions on the vertices
of graphs, and the binary relation relates each graph to its (proper) 3-colorings.
Similarly, there is a search version of the boolean satisfiability problem, where
instances are boolean formulas, witnesses are truth assignments, and the binary
relation is the satisfaction relation. Notice that a search problem is just an object
A of PV , the set of instances being A− and the set of witnesses A+.
There is a reasonable analog of many-one reducibility in the context of search
problems. A reduction of B to A should first convert every instance b ∈ B− of B
to an instance a ∈ A− of A (just as for decision problems), and then, if a witness
w related to a is given, it should allow us, using w and remembering the original
instance b, to compute a witness related to b. Again, an algorithm computing
such a reduction and an algorithm solving A can clearly be combined to yield
an algorithm solving B. Most known many-one reductions between NP decision
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problems [8] implicitly involve many-one reductions of the corresponding search
problems.
Formally, a reduction therefore consists of two functions, f− : B− → A− and
f+ : A+ ×B− → B+ such that, for all b ∈ B− and w ∈ A+,
A(f−(b), w) =⇒ B(b, f+(w, b)).
This is nearly, but not quite, the definition of a morphism from A to B. The
difference is that in a morphism f+ would have only w, not b, as its argument.
Thus, morphisms amount to reductions where the final witness (for b) is computed
from a witness w for a = f−(b) without remembering b. This notion of reduction
has been used in the literature [12, 19], but I would not argue that it is as natural
as the version where one is allowed to remember b.
These observations lead to a suggestion that we record for future reference.
Suggestion 1. Find a natural place in the theory of PV for reductions as de-
scribed above, i.e., pairs of functions that are like morphisms except that f+ takes
an additional argument from B− and the implication relating f− and f+ is amended
accordingly.
A “dual” modification of the notion of morphism, allowing f− to have an extra
argument in A+, occurred in de Paiva’s work [14] on a categorial version of Go¨del’s
Dialectica interpretation, work that preceded the introduction of PV in [15].
Linear Logic
The search problems (objects of PV) and reductions (morphisms of PV or gener-
alized morphisms as in Suggestion 1) described in the preceding section are vaguely
related to some of the intuitions that underlie Girard’s linear logic [9]. Girard has
written about linear logic as a logic of questions and answers (or actions and re-
actions) [9, 10], so it seems reasonable to try to model this idea in terms of PV .
Also, the fact that in a many-one reduction of B to A a witness for B is produced
from exactly one witness for A is reminiscent of the central idea of linear logic that
a conclusion is obtained by using each hypothesis exactly once. In this section,
we attempt to make these vague intuitions precise. Our goal here is to develop
de Paiva’s interpretation of linear logic (at least the multiplicative and additive
parts; the exponentials will be discussed briefly later) in a step by step fashion that
emphasizes the naturality or necessity of the definitions used.
We intend to use objects of PV as the interpretations of the formulas of linear
logic. This corresponds to Girard’s intuition that for any formula A there are
questions and answers of type A. Of course, in addition to questions and answers,
objects of PV also have a correctness relation between them. It is reasonable to
expect that one formula linearly implies another, in a particular interpretation, if
and only if there is a morphism in PV from (the object interpreting) the former to
(the object interpreting) the latter; we shall see this more precisely later.
To produce an interpretation of linear logic, we must tell how to interpret the
connectives, and we must define what it means for a sequent to be true in an
interpretation.
Perhaps the easiest part of this task is to interpret the additive connectives, &
and ⊕. It seems to be universally accepted [17] that a reasonable categorial model
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of linear logic will interpret these as the product and coproduct of the category. For-
tunately, PV has products and coproducts, so we adopt these as the interpretations
of the additive connectives. The result is that “with” is interpreted as
(A−, A+, A)&(B−, B+, B) = (A− +B−, A+ ×B+,W ),
where
W (x, (a, b)) ⇐⇒
{
A(x, a), if x ∈ A−
B(x, b), if x ∈ B−;
“plus” is interpreted as
(A−, A+, A)⊕ (B−, B+, B) = (A− ×B−, A+ +B+, V )
where
V ((a, b), x) ⇐⇒
{
A(a, x), if x ∈ A+
B(b, x), if x ∈ B+;
and the additive units are
⊤ = (∅, 1, ∅) and 0 = (1, ∅, ∅),
where 1 represents any one-element set.
These definitions correspond reasonably well to the intuitive meanings of the
additive connectives in terms of questions and answers or in terms of Girard’s
“action” description of linear logic [10]. To answer a disjunction A⊕B is to provide
an answer to one of A and B; correctness means that, confronted with questions of
both types, we answer one of them correctly (in the sense of A or B). To answer
a conjunction A&B we must give answers for both, but we are confronted with a
question of only one type and only our answer to that one needs to be correct. The
intuitive discussion of conjunction, in particular the fact that we must give answers
of both types even though only one will be relevant to the question, might make
better sense if we think of the answer as being given before the question is known.
This is a rather strange way of running a dialogue, but it will arise again later in
other contexts (and I’ve seen examples of it in real life).
There is also a natural interpretation of linear negation, since (cf. [9, 10]) ques-
tions of type A are answers of type the negation A⊥ of A and vice versa. We
define
(A−, A+, A)
⊥
= (A+, A−, A
⊥),
where
A⊥(x, y) ⇐⇒ ¬A(y, x).
So linear negation interchanges questions with answers and replaces the correctness
relation by the complement of its converse. Perhaps a few words should be said
about the use of the complement of the converse rather than just the converse.
There are several reasons for this, perhaps the most intuitive being that we are,
after all, defining a sort of negation. Another way to look at it is to think of a
contest between a questioner and an answerer, where success for the questioner
is defined to mean failure for the answerer (cf. the discussion of challengers and
solvers in [11]). “That’s a good question” often means that I have no good answer.
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For another indication that the given definition of ⊥ is appropriate, see the section
on set-theoretic applications below.
Mathematically, the strongest reason for defining ⊥ as we did is that it gives a
contravariant involution of the category PV . That is, the operation ⊥ on objects
and the operation on morphisms defined by (f−, f+)
⊥ = (f+, f−) constitute a con-
travariant functor from PV to itself, whose square is the identity. This corresponds
to the equivalences in linear logic between A ⊢ B and B⊥ ⊢ A⊥ and between A⊥⊥
and A.
We turn now to a more delicate matter, the interpretation of the multiplicative
connectives. We begin with “times.” Girard’s intuitive explanation of the difference
between the multiplicative conjunction ⊗ and the additive conjunction & in [10]
is that the former represents an ability to perform both actions while the latter
represents an ability to do either one of the two actions (chosen externally). Looking
back at the interpretation of &, we would expect to modify it by allowing questions
of both sorts, rather than just one, and requiring both components of the answer to
be correct. This operation on objects of PV is quite natural, and occurs in both [15]
and [21]. De Paiva uses the notation ⊗ for it, although it is not the interpretation of
Girard’s connective ⊗ in her interpretation of linear logic. Vojta´sˇ uses the notation
× even though it is not the product in the category. We shall use the notation ⊗
and regard it as a sort of provisional tensor product. Formally, we define
(A−, A+, A)⊗(B−, B+, B) = (A− ×B−, A+ ×B+, A×B),
where the relation A×B is defined by
(A×B)((x, y), (a, b)) ⇐⇒ A(x, a) and B(y, b).
Of course, since we have already interpreted negation, our provisional ⊗ gives rise
to a dual connective, the provisional “par”:
(A−, A+, A)
..............
...... (B−, B+, B) = (A− ×B−, A+ ×B+, P )
where
P ((x, y), (a, b)) ⇐⇒ A(x, a) or B(y, b).
To see why these interpretations of the multiplicative connectives are only provi-
sional and must be modified, we turn to the question of soundness of the interpre-
tation. This requires, of course, that we define what is meant by a sequent being
valid, which presumably depends on a notion of sequents being true in particular
interpretations, i.e, with particular objects as values of the atomic formulas. For
simplicity, we work with one-sided sequents, as in [9]. So a sequent is a finite list
(or multi-set) of formulas, each interpreted as an object of PV. Since a sequent is
deductively equivalent in linear logic with the par of its members, we interpret the
sequent as the (provisional) par of its members, i.e., as a certain object of PV. So
we must specify what we mean by truth of an object of PV , and then we must try
to verify the soundness of the axioms and rules of linear logic.
There are two plausible interpretations of truth of an object A = (A−, A+, A),
both saying intuitively that one can answer all the questions of type A. The
difference between the two is in whether the answer can depend on the question.
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The first (provisional) interpretation of truth allows the answer to depend on
the question, as one would probably expect intuitively.
|=1 (A−, A+, A) ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ A− ∃y ∈ A+A(x, y).
The second, stronger (provisional) interpretation is that one answer must uniformly
answer all questions correctly.
|=2 (A−, A+, A) ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ A+ ∀x ∈ A−A(x, y).
Before dismissing the second interpretation as unreasonably strong, one should
note that the two interpretations are dual to each other in the sense that A is
true in either sense if and only if its negation A⊥ is not true in the other sense.
Furthermore, the second definition fits better with the idea that truth of a sequent
A ⊢ B should mean the existence of a morphism from A to B. If we specialize to
the case where A is the multiplicative unit 1, so that the sequent A ⊢ B becomes
deductively equivalent (in linear logic) with ⊢ B, and if we note that the unit for
our provisional ⊗ is (1, 1, true), then we see that truth of B should be equivalent to
existence of a morphism from (1, 1, true) to B. It is easily checked that existence
of such a morphism is precisely the second definition of truth above.
Finally, as we shall see in a moment, each definition has its own advantages and
disadvantages when one tries to prove the soundness of linear logic, and eventually
we shall need to adopt a compromise between them. The remark above about
the relationship between |=1, |=2 and negation suggests that either version of |=,
used alone, might have difficulties with the axioms ⊢ A,A⊥ (which say that linear
negation is no stronger than it should be) or the cut rule (which says that linear
negation is no weaker than it should be). Let us consider what happens if one tries
to establish the soundness of the axioms and cut for either version of |=.
For the axioms, we wish to show that A
..............
...... A⊥ is true for each object A of PV .
In A
.............
...... A⊥, the questions are pairs (x, y) where x ∈ A− and y ∈ (A
⊥)− = A+,
and the answers are pairs (a, b) where a ∈ A+ and b ∈ (A
⊥)+ = A−. The answer
(a, b) is correct for the question (x, y) if and only if either A(x, a) or ¬A(b, y) (the
latter being the definition of A⊥(y, b)). Obviously, any question (x, y) is correctly
answered by (y, x). So |=1 A
.............
....... A⊥. On the other hand, we do not in general
have |=2 A
.............
....... A⊥, since an easy calculation shows that this would mean that in
A either some answer is correct for all questions or some question has no correct
answer. There are, of course, easy examples of A where this fails; the simplest is
to take A− = A+ = ∅, and if one insists on non-empty sets then the simplest is
A− = A+ = {1, 2} with A being the relation of equality. So, for the soundness of
the axioms, |=1 works properly, but |=2 does not.
Now consider the cut rule. We wish to show that, if B
..............
......... A and C
.............
....... A⊥ are true,
then so is B
.............
....... C. If we interpret truth as |=2, then this is easy. Suppose (b, x)
correctly answers all questions in B
.............
....... A and (c, y) correctly answers all questions in
C
.............
...... A⊥; we claim that (b, c) correctly answers all questions (p, q) in B
.............
....... C. Indeed,
if (p, q) were a counterexample, then b is not correct for p and c is not correct
for q, yet (b, x) is correct for (p, y) and (c, y) is correct for (q, x) (where the four
occurrences of “correct” refer to B, C, B
.............
....... A, and C
..............
...... A⊥, respectively). But then
we must have, by definition of
.............
....... , that x correctly answers y in A and that y
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correctly answers x in A⊥. That is impossible, by definition of ⊥, so the cut rule
preserves |=2. Unfortunately, it fails to preserve |=1. The easiest counterexamples
occur when both B and C have questions with no correct answers (but B+ and C+
are non-empty). Then B
..............
...... C is not true, so the soundness of the cut rule would
require that at least one of B
.............
....... A and C
.............
....... A⊥ also fail to be true. That means
that either A or its negation must have a question with no correct answer, i.e., in
A either some answer is correct for all questions or some question has no correct
answer. Since that is not the case in general, we conclude that the cut rule is
unsound for |=1.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we have
(1) If we define truth allowing answers to depend on questions (|=1), then the
axioms of linear logic are sound but the cut rule is not.
(2) If we define truth requiring the answer to be independent of the question
(|=2), then the cut rule is sound but the axioms are not.
Fortunately, there is a way out of this dilemma. Consider the dependence of answers
on questions that was needed to obtain the soundness of the axioms. At first sight,
it is an extremely strong dependence; indeed, the answer (y, x) is, except for the
order of components, identical to the question (x, y). But the dependence is special
in that each component of the answer depends only on the other component of the
question.
Rather surprisingly, this sort of cross-dependence also makes the cut rule sound.
To see this, suppose that both B
.............
....... A and C
..............
....... A⊥ are true in this new sense. That
is, there are functions f : B− → A+ and g : A− → B+ such that, for all b ∈ B−
and x ∈ A−,
(1) B(b, g(x)) or A(x, f(b)),
and similarly there are f ′ : C− → (A
⊥)+ = A− and g
′ : (A⊥)− = A+ → C+ such
that, for all c ∈ C− and all y ∈ A+,
(2) C(c, g′(y)) or ¬A(f ′(c), y).
Then we claim that g′ ◦ f : B− → C+ and g ◦ f
′ : C− → B+ satisfy, for all b ∈ B−
and c ∈ C−,
B(b, g(f ′(c))) or C(c, g′(f(b))),
which means that B
.............
....... C is true in the “cross-dependence” sense. To verify the
claim, let such b and c be given. If A(f ′(c), f(b)), then (2) implies C(c, g′(f(b))). If
¬A(f ′(c), f(b)), then (1) implies B(b, g(f ′(c))). So the claim is true in either case,
and we have verified the soundness of the cut rule.
By allowing the answer in one component of a sequent to depend on the questions
in the other components but not in the same component, this “cross-dependence”
notion of truth makes crucial use of the commas in a sequent, to distinguish the
components. But linear logic requires (by the introduction rules for times and
especially for par) that the commas in a sequent behave exactly like the connective
.............
....... . So it seems necessary to build cross-dependence into the interpretation of this
connective. This will lead to the correct definition of the multiplicative connectives,
replacing the provisional interpretations given earlier.
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We define the par operation on objects of PV by
(A−, A+, A)
.............
...... (B−, B+, B) = (A− ×B−, A
B
−
+ ×B
A
−
+ , P )
where
P ((x, y), (f, g)) ⇐⇒ A(x, f(y)) or B(y, g(x)).
This operation
.............
....... is the object part of a functor, the action on morphisms being
(f
.............
....... g)− = f− × g− and (f
.............
....... g)+ = f
g
−
+ × g
f
−
+ . It is easy to check that
.............
....... is
associative (up to natural isomorphism). In the par of several objects, questions
are tuples consisting of one question from each of the objects, and answers are
tuples of functions, each producing an answer in one component when given as
inputs questions in all the other components.
We also interpret commas in sequents as the new
.............
...... (rather than
.............
....... ). This change
in the interpretation of the commas makes |=2 behave like the cross-dependence
notion of truth described earlier. To see this, note that |=2 requires the existence
of a single answer correct for all questions at once, but the new
..............
...... allows that
answer to consist of functions whereby each component of the answer can depend
on the other components of the question. We therefore adopt |=2 as the (non-
provisional) definition of truth, and from now on we write it simply as |=. The
previous discussion shows that the axioms and the cut rule are sound. We sometimes
refer to an answer that is correct for all questions in an object A as a solution of
the problem A. So truth means having a solution.
Of course, the new interpretation of par gives, by duality, a new interpretation
of times.
(A−, A+, A)⊗ (B−, B+, B) = (A
B+
− ×B
A+
− , A+ ×B+, T ),
where
T ((f, g), (x, y)) ⇐⇒ A(f(y), x) and B(g(x), y).
(This connective was called ⊘ in [15].) The units for the multiplicative connectives
are 1 = (1, 1, true) and ⊥ = (1, 1, false), where true and false represent the obvious
relations on a singleton. The linear implication A⊸ B defined as A⊥
.............
....... B is
(A−, A+, A)⊸ (B−, B+, B) = (A+ ×B−, A
B
−
− ×B
A+
+ , C),
where
C((x, y), (f, g)) ⇐⇒ [A(f(y), x) =⇒ B(y, g(x))].
Notice that a solution of A⊸ B is precisely a morphism A → B in PV . This
indicates that the definitions of the multiplicative connectives and of truth, though
not immediately intuitive, are proper in the context of the category PV.
The belief that these definitions are reasonable is reinforced by de Paiva’s the-
orem [15] that the multiplicative and additive fragment of linear logic is sound for
this interpretation. (Her theorem actually covers full linear logic, including the
exponentials, but we have not yet discussed the interpretation of the exponentials.)
Linear logic is not complete for this interpretation. For one thing, the interpre-
tation validates the mix rule: If A and B are both true, then so is A
.............
....... B. Also,
the interpretation satisfies all formulas of the form A⊥
.............
....... (A
.............
....... A), a special case of
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weakening. (General weakening, A⊥
..............
...... (A
..............
...... B) is not satisfied; for a counterexample,
take B+ to be empty while all of A+, A−, B− are non-empty.)
The interpretations of ⊗ and
.............
....... remain, in spite of their success at modeling
linear logic, rather unintuitive. This is attested by the fact that de Paiva [15],
while using ⊗ to interpret the multiplicative conjunction, calls it ⊘ and reserves
the symbol ⊗ for the more intuitive construction that I called ⊗. Vojta´sˇ [21] also
discusses ⊗, calling it ×, but never has any use for ⊗. Since ⊗ seems much more
natural than the “correct” ⊗, it should have its own place in the logic.
Suggestion 2. Find a natural place in the theory of PV for the operation ⊗.
Cardinal Characteristics of the Continuum
We begin this section by introducing a few (just enough to serve as examples
later) of the many cardinal characteristics of the continuum that have been studied
by set-theorists, topologists, and others. For more information about these and
other characteristics, see [18] and the references cited there. All the cardinal char-
acteristics considered here (and almost all the others) are uncountable cardinals
smaller than or equal to the cardinality c = 2ℵ0 of the continuum. So they are of
little interest if the continuum hypothesis (c = ℵ1) holds, but in the absence of the
continuum hypothsis there are many interesting connections, usually in the form of
inequalities, between various characteristics. (There are also independence results
showing that certain inequalities are not provable from the usual ZFC axioms of
set theory.) Part of the work of Vojta´sˇ [21, 22] on which this section is based can
be viewed as a way to extract from the inequality proofs information which is of
interest even if the continuum hypothesis holds.
Definitions. If X and Y are subsets of N, we say that X splits Y if both Y ∩X
and Y −X are infinite. The splitting number s is the smallest cardinality of any
family S of subsets of N such that every infinite subset of N is split by some element
of S. The refining number (also called the unsplitting or reaping number) r is the
smallest cardinality of any family R of infinite subsets of N such that no single set
splits all the sets in R. rσ is the smallest cardinality of any family R of infinite
subsets of N such that, for any countably many subsets Sk of N, some set in R is
not split by any Sk.
These cardinals arise naturally in analysis, for example in connection with the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, which asserts that a bounded sequence of real num-
bers has a convergent subsequence. A straightforward diagonal argument extends
this to show that, for any countably many bounded sequences of real numbers
xk = (xkn)n∈N, there is a single infinite A ⊆ N such that the subsequences indexed
by A, (xkn)n∈A, all converge. If one tries to extend this to uncountably many se-
quences, then the first cardinal for which the analogous result fails is s. Also, rσ
is the smallest cardinality of any family R of infinite subsets of N such that, for
every bounded sequence (xn)n∈N, there is a convergent subsequence (xn)n∈A with
A ∈ R. There is an analogous description of r, where the sequences (xn)n∈N are
required to have only finitely many distinct terms. For more information about
these aspects of the cardinal characteristics, see [20].
Definitions. A function f : N → N dominates another such function g if, for all
but finitely many n ∈ N, f(n) ≤ g(n). The dominating number d is the smallest
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cardinality of any family D ⊆ NN such that every g ∈ NN is dominated by some
f ∈ D. The bounding number b is the smallest cardinality of any family B ⊆ NN
such that no single g dominates all the members of B.
The known inequalities between these cardinals (and ℵ1 and c = 2
ℵ0) are
ℵ1 ≤ s ≤ d ≤ c,
ℵ1 ≤ b ≤ r ≤ rσ ≤ c,
and
b ≤ d.
It is known that any further inequalities between these cardinals are independent
of ZFC, except that it is still an open problem whether r = rσ is provable.
The connection between the theory of these cardinals and the category PV dis-
cussed in previous sections becomes visible when one considers the proofs of some
of these inequalities, so we shall prove the two non-trivial (but well known) ones,
s ≤ d and b ≤ r. (In each case, only the first of the two paragraphs in the proof is
relevant to PV , so the reader willing to take the first paragraph on faith can skip
the justification in the second paragraph.)
Proof of s ≤ d. There is a map α : NN → P(N) sending every dominating family
D (as in the definition of d) to a splitting family (as in the definition of s). In fact,
one can associate to each infinite X ⊆ N a function β(X) = f ∈ NN such that, if g
dominates f , then α(g) splits X .
Given g, to define α(g), partition N into a sequence of intervals [0, a1), [a1, a2), . . .
such that, for each n ∈ N, g(n) is at most one interval beyond n (it’s trivial to define
such ai’s by induction), and let α(g) be the union of the even-numbered intervals.
Define β(X) to send each n ∈ N to the next element of X greater than n. If
f = β(X), if g dominates f , if ai’s are as in the definition of α(g), and if k is large
enough, then the element f(ak− 1) of X lies in the interval [ak, ak+1). So X meets
all but finitely many of the intervals [ak, ak+1) and is therefore split by α(g). 
Proof of b ≤ r. There is a function β : P∞(N) → N
N sending every unsplittable
family R (as in the definition of r) to an undominated family (as in the definiiton
of b). In fact, one can associate to each g ∈ NN a set α(g) = Y ∈ P(N) such that,
if Y does not split X then g does not dominate β(X).
The same α and β as in the preceding proof will work, as the properties required
of them here are logically equivalent to the properties required there. 
In the notation of the preceding sections, the pair (β, α) in the first of these proofs
is a morphism in PV from (NN,NN, is majorized by) to (P∞(N),P(N), is split by).
In the second proof, we used the image of this under ⊥, namely that (α, β) is a
morphism from (P(N),P∞(N), does not split) to (N
N,NN, does not majorize). In
both cases, the cardinal inequality follows from the following general fact. Define
for each objectA of PV the norm ‖A‖ as the smallest cardinality of any setX ⊆ A+
of answers sufficient to contain at least one correct answer for every question in A−
(undefined if there is no such set, i.e., if some question has no correct answer, i.e., if
A⊥ is true). Then the existence of a morphism f : A→ B implies that ‖A‖ ≥ ‖B‖,
because f+ sends any set of the sort required in the definition of ‖A‖ to one as
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required for ‖B‖. (What I called the norm of A is, in Vojta´sˇ’s notation [21, 22]
d(A); Vojta´sˇ’s b(A) is ‖A⊥‖.)
It is an empirical fact that proofs of inequalities between cardinal characteristics
of the continuum usually proceed by representing the characteristics as norms of
objects in PV and then exhibiting explicit morphisms between those objects. This
fact is explicit in Vojta´sˇ’s [21, 22] and implicit in [7]. It applies even to trivial in-
equalities like b ≤ d (where the required morphism from (NN,NN, is dominated by)
to (NN,NN, does not dominate) consists of identity maps on both components) as
well as to inequalities much deeper than the examples proved above; see for exam-
ple the presentation in [7] of Bartoszyn´ski’s theorem [3] that the smallest number
of meager sets whose union is not meager is at least as large as the corresponding
number for “measure zero” in place of “meager.”
It is tempting to regard the existence of a morphism A→ B as a strong formu-
lation of the inequality ‖A‖ ≥ ‖B‖ that is significant even in the presence of the
continuum hypothesis (which makes inequalities between cardinal characteristics
trivial as these cardinals lie between ℵ1 and c inclusive). The situation is, however,
not quite so simple. My student, Olga Yiparaki, has shown that, in the presence of
the continuum hypothesis (or certain weaker assumptions), there are morphisms in
PV in both directions between any two objects that correspond (as in [21, 22]) to
cardinal characteristics of the continuum. Those morphisms, however, are highly
non-constructive, whereas those used in the usual proofs of cardinal inequalities
are quite explicit. It therefore seems likely that a strengthening of these cardinal
inequalities that retains its significance in the presence of the continuum hypothe-
sis is to require not merely the existence of morphisms but the existence of “nice”
morphisms, say ones whose components are Borel mappings.
The linear negation defined on PV gives a precise version of an intuitive “du-
ality” in the theory of cardinal characteristics. In that theory, one often refers to
the cardinals ‖A‖ and ‖A⊥‖ as being dual to each other; see for example the in-
troduction to [13]. On cardinals, this is not well defined, for two objects can have
the same norm while their negations have different norms, but it is the shadow, in
the world of cardinals, of the (well defined) linear negation in PV . It may be worth
noting in this connection that (P(N),P∞(N), does not split), whose norm is r, and
(P(N)N,P∞(N), has no component that splits), whose norm is rσ, have negations
both of norm s.
In addition to inequalities of the sort discussed above, which relate two cardi-
nal characteristics of the continuum, there are a few theorems that relate three
(occasionally even four) of them. We consider one relatively easy example here,
since it leads to an idea that should connect to linear logic. The example concerns
Ramsey’s theorem [16], which asserts (in a simple form) that, whenever the set [N]2
of two-element subsets of N is partitioned into two pieces, then there is an infinite
H ⊆ N that is homogeneous in the sense that all its two element subsets lie in the
same piece of the partition. The cardinal hom was defined in [5] as the smallest
cardinality of a family H of infinite subsets of N such that, for every partition of
[N]2 as in Ramsey’s theorem, a homogeneous set can be found in H. It was shown
in [5] that this cardinal is bounded below by max{r, d} and above by max{rσ, d}.
The lower bound amounts to two ordinary inequalities, hom ≥ r and hom ≥ d, both
of which were proved by exhibiting morphisms between the appropriate objects of
PV . The upper bound genuinely relates three cardinals, and we wish to make some
comments about its proof, so we begin by sketching the proof.
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Proof of hom ≤ max{rσ, d}. Fix a family R0 of rσ subsets of N such that no
countably many sets split all the sets in R0. Within each set A ∈ R0, fix a family
R1(A) of r sets such that no single set splits them all. Also, fix a family D of
functions dominating all functions N→ N. For each A ∈ R0, for each B ∈ R1(A),
and for each f ∈ D, choose a subset Z = Z(A,B, f) of B so thin that, if x < y
are in Z then f(x) < y. We claim that the family H of all these Z’s, which clearly
has cardinality max{rσ, d} (since r ≤ rσ), contains almost homogeneous sets for
all partitions of [N]2 into two parts. “Almost homogeneous” means that the set
becomes homogeneous when finitely many of its elements are removed. Since we
can close H under such finite changes without increasing its cardinality, the claim
completes the proof.
To prove the claim, let [N]2 be partitioned into two parts. For each natural
number n let Cn consist of those x for which {n, x} is in the first part. By choice
of R0, it contains a set A unsplit by any Cn. Let g(n) be so large that all x ∈ A
with x ≥ g(n) have {n, x} in the same piece of the partition, and let Q be the set
of n for which this is the first piece. Choose B ∈ R1(A) unsplit by Q and f ∈ D
dominating g. It is then easy to check that Z(A,B, f) is almost homogeneous for
the given partition. 
To discuss this proof in terms of PV , we introduce the natural objects of PV
whose norms are the cardinals under consideration. For mnemonic purposes, we
name each object with the capital letter corresponding to the lower-case letter
naming the cardinal.
HOM = ({p | p : [N]2 → 2},P∞(N), AH),
where AH is the relation of almost homogeneity, AH(p,H) means that H is almost
homogeneous for the partition p.
D = (NN,NN, is dominated by).
R = (P(N),P∞(N), does not split).
Rσ = (P(N)
N,P∞(N), has no component that splits).
The structure of the preceding proof is then as follows. From a question p in
HOM, we first produced a question (Cn)n∈N in Rσ. Using an answer A to this
question and also using again the original question p, we produced questions g in
D and Q in R. From answers f and B to these questions, along with the previous
answer A, we finally produced an answer H to the original question p in HOM.
This can be described as a morphism into HOM from a suitable combination of
D, R, and Rσ, but the relevant combination is a bit different from what we have
considered previously. The part of the construction involving D and R is just the
provisional tensor product ⊗; that is, we had a question (g,Q) in D⊗R and we
obtained an answer (f, B) for it. (Strictly speaking, we used a version of R on A
rather than on N, but we shall ignore this detail.) The novelty is in how D⊗R is
combined with Rσ. For what we produced from p was a question in Rσ together
with a function converting answers to this question into questions in D⊗R. This
thing that we produced ought to be a question in the object that is being mapped
to HOM. An answer in that object ought to be what we used in order to get the
answer H for HOM, namely (A,B, f).
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Motivated by these considerations, we define a connective, denoted by a semi-
colon (to suggest sequential composition), as follows.
(A−, A+, A); (B−, B+, B) = (A− ×B
A+
− , A+ ×B+, S),
where
S((x, f), (a, b)) ⇐⇒ A(x, a) and B(f(a), b).
Thus, a question of sort A;B consists of a first question in A, followed by a second
question in B that may depend on the answer to the first. A correct answer consists
of correct answers to both of the constituent questions. Thus, squential composition
can be viewed as describing a dialog in which the questioner first asks a question
in A, is given an answer, selects on the basis of this answer a question in B, and is
given an answer to this as well.
The proof of hom ≤ max{rσ, d} exhibits a morphism from Rσ; (D⊗R) toHOM.
The cardinal inequality follows from the existence of such a morphism, since one
easily checks that the operations on infinite cardinal norms corresponding to the
operations ⊗ and ; are both simply max.
The sequential composition of objects of PV occurs repeatedly in the proofs of
inequalities relating three cardinal characteristics. A typical example is the proof
that the minimum number of meager sets of reals with a non-meager union is the
minimum of b and the minimum number of meager sets that cover the real line
[13, 4, 7]. Vojta´sˇ [21] describes the strategy for proving such three-way relations
between cardinals in terms of what he calls a max-min diagram. This diagram
amounts exacly to a morphism from the sequential composition of two objects to
a third object. In other words, sequential composition is the reification of the
max-min diagram as an object of PV .
Sequential composition also seems a natural concept to add to linear logic from
the computational point of view. Linear logic is generally viewed as a logic of
parallel computation, but even parallel computations often have sequential parts,
so it seems reasonable to include in the logic a way to describe sequentiality. These
ideas are not yet sufficiently developed to support any claims about sequential
composition, as defined in the PV model, being the (or a) right way to do this.
In addition to semantical interpretations, one would certainly want good axioms
governing any sequential composition connective that is to be added to linear logic,
and one would hope that some of the pleasant proof theory of linear logic would
survive the addition. Much remains to be done in this direction.
Suggestion 3. Find a place for sequential composition (specifically for the connec-
tive called ; above) in linear logic and the theory of PV.
Generalized Multiplicative Connectives
The previous sections have led to three suggestions of natural connectives to
add to linear logic. (Actually, Suggestion 1 concerned not a connective but a
modified notion of morphism. But such a modification should correspond to a
reinterpretation of ⊸ and therefore of
.............
....... and ⊗ as well.) The suggested new
connectives are all analogous to the multiplicatives in that both the set of questions
and the set of answers are cartesian products. (For the additive connectives, one
of the two sets was a disjoint union.) The factors in these products are either sets
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of questions or answers from the constituent objects or else sets of functions, from
questions to answers or vice versa. With these preliminary comments, it seems
natural to describe general multiplicative conjunctions (cousins of ⊗) as follows.
A general multiplicative conjunction operates on n objects A1 . . .An of PV to
produce an object C, where C+ = A1+× . . . An+ and where C− consists of n-tuples
(fi) of functions where fi maps some product of Aj+’s into Ai−. Which Aj+’s
occur in the domain of which fi’s is given by the specification of the particular
connective. An answer (ai) is correct for a question (fi) if each ai correctly answers
in Ai the question obtained by evaluating fi at the relevant aj ’s.
For example, ⊗ is a generalized multiplicative conjunction, for which n = 2
and each fi has domain Aj for the j different from i. Similarly, we obtain ⊗ if
the domains of the fi’s are taken to be empty products (i.e., singletons); no j is
relevant to any i. Sequential composition is obtained by having f1 depend on no
arguments while f2 has an argument in A1.
Dual (via ⊥) to generalized multiplicative conjunctions are generalized multi-
plicative disjunctions. Here the answers are allowed to depend on some questions,
rather than vice versa (exactly which dependences are allowed is the specification
of a particular connective), and correctness means correctness in at least one com-
ponent, rather than in all.
To avoid possible confusion, we stress that the generalization of the multiplica-
tive connectives proposed here is quite different from that proposed by Danos and
Regnier [6]. The Danos-Regnier multiplicatives can correspond to many different
classical connectives, whereas mine correspond only to conjunction and disjunction.
One could, of course, consider combining the two generalizations, but we do not
attempt this here.
There are non-trivial unary conjunction and disjunction connectives. The con-
junction is given by
κ(A−, A+, A) = (A
A+
− , A+, κA),
where
κA(f, a) ⇐⇒ A(f(a), a).
The dual disjunction is
α(A−, A+, A) = (A−, A
A
−
+ , αA)
where
αA(a, f) ⇐⇒ A(a, f(a)).
These operations were called T and R in [15].
The modified concept of morphism from A to B in Suggestion 1, where f+ maps
A+ ×B−, rather than just B−, into B+, amounts to a morphism (in the standard
PV sense) from A to αB. This concept of morphism thus gives rise to the Kleisli
category of PV with respect to the monad α. (We have defined α only on objects,
but it is routine to define it on morphisms and to describe its monad structure.)
De Paiva’s Dialectica category [14] built over the category of sets has as mor-
phisms A → B the PV morphisms κA → B. It is dual (via ⊥) to the category in
the preceding paragraph and is the co-Kleisli category of the comonad κ (see [15,
Prop. 7]).
The connective α also provides a way to reinstate the notion of truth |=1 that
was discarded when we replaced the provisional ⊗ and
.............
....... with the final versions.
Indeed, |=1 A holds if and only if |= αA.
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Exponentials
Girard has pointed out that the exponential connectives or modalities, ! and
?, unlike the other connectives, are not determined by the axioms of linear logic.
More precisely, if one added to linear logic a second pair of modalities, say !′ and
?′, subject to the same rules of inference as the original pair, then one could not
deduce that the new modalities are equivalent to the old. Several versions of the
exponentials could coexist in one model of linear logic.
PV provides an example of this phenomenon. De Paiva [15] gave an interpre-
tation of the exponentials in which ! is a combination of the unary conjunction κ
defined above and a construction S where multisets m of questions are regarded as
questions and a correct answer to m is a single answer that is correct for all the
questions in m. (Neither κ nor S alone can serve as an interpretation of !.) Another
interpretation of the exponentials in PV, validating the exponential rules of linear
logic, is given by
!(A−, A+, A) = (1, A+, U)
where 1 is a singleton, say {∗} and
U(∗, a) ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ A−A(x, a),
and its dual
?(A−, A+, A) = (A−, 1, E)
where
E(a, ∗) ⇐⇒ ∃x ∈ A+A(a, x).
Intuitively, a question of type !A (namely ∗) amounts to all questions of type A; a
correct answer in !A must correctly answer all questions in A simultaneously.
It is easy to check that Girard’s rules of inference for the exponentials are sound
for this simple interpretation.
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